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Title VII Tenure Litigation in the
Academy and Academic Freedom-A
Current Appraisal
Thomas Grexa*
I. Introduction
Higher education in America in the 1990s is under siege as
never before. Congressional investigations into universities' federal
research and spending practices make front-page news.' Victorious
university athletic teams are threatened with not defending their
championships because of recruiting violations.' University leaders
decry the increasingly business-like orientation of academic institutions and the pursuit of profit rather than academic independence
and integrity.3 Academic institutions, once uniquely regarded and
respected, are now more rigorously scrutinized by outsiders. Their
celebrated traditions and autonomous internal practices have become
increasingly suspect.
One such practice under review is the granting of tenure. Tenure, the unique tradition of providing an academic "a guaranteed
appointment until retirement age, ' 4 has long been accorded judicial
protection as an essential "academic freedom." However, on Janu*
Director of Career Planning and Placement, The Dickinson School of Law; J.D., University of Virginia; LL.M., University of Pennsylvania. The author acknowledges the assistance of Professors Seth Kreimer of the University of Pennsylvania and Robert Rains of the
Dickinson School of Law for their assistance in the preparation of this Article.
1. Collen Cordes, Angry Lawmakers Grill Stanford's Kennedy on Research Costs,
CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUC., March 20, 1991, at Al; Philip J. Hills, Nobelist Caught Up in
Fraud Case Resigns as Head of Rockefeller U., NEw YORK TIMES, Dec. 3, 1991, at Al.
2. U.N.L.V. Barred From Defending Its Title, NEW YORK TIMES, July 21, 1990, at 41.
3. Remarks of outgoing Harvard University President Derek Bok, as reported by Liz
McMillen, Quest for Profits May Damage Basic Values of Universities, Harvard's Bok
Warns, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUC., April 24, 1991, at Al.
4. Kingman Brewster, On Tenure, 58 AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS BULL. 381 (1972) (excerpted from the 1972 Yale Presidential Report). For a historical
development of the prominence of academic tenure in American colleges and universities, see
Ralph S. Brown & Jordan E. Kurland, Academic Tenure and Academic Freedom, 53 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 325, 326 (1990). For a persuasive argument on what stahdards should be
employed in the tenure review process, see Stephen L. Carter, Academic Tenure and "White
Male" Standards:Some Lessonsfrom the Patent Law, 100 YALE L.J. 2065, 2081 (1991) (two
basic requirements include a scholar's extensive knowledge in a particular field of research and
a novel approach to the subject in light of past work).
5. The standard was articulated in Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
See infra note 8 and accompanying text. But see Gray v. Board of Higher Educ., 692 F.2d
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ary 9, 1990, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down a decision in
which the effect on academia may well be felt for years to come. In
University of Pennsylvania v. Equal Employment Opportunity

Comm'n,6 a unanimous Court held that a university enjoys no special privilege requiring a judicial finding of particular need, beyond a
showing of mere relevance, before confidential peer review materials

pertinent to a Title VII charge of discrimination in a tenure decision
are disclosed to the EEOC.7 The decision marks a departure from a

long-standing tradition of judicial deference in academic hiring decisions" and will likely affect the nature of confidential peer review
documents reviewed in Title VII discrimination complaint
investigations. 9
Some observers of the case have expressed concern for the sanc-

tioned, enhanced intrusion of government into the affairs of the
academy." ° It is argued that the nature of academic hiring will be
901, 905 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that black educator at community college alleging race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 is entitled to discovery of two colleagues' votes regarding
tenure despite college's claim that votes were subject to a qualified "academic freedom" privilege). See also William H. Daughtrey, Jr., The Legal Nature of Academic Freedom in United
States Colleges and Universities, 25 U. RICH. L. REV. 233 (1991) (arguing that courts serve as
the ultimate guardian of free expression of ideas in colleges and universities).
6. 493 U.S. 182 (1990) [hereinafter the Pennsylvania case].
7. Id. at 196. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it illegal to discriminate
on the basis of race, color, religion, age, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988).
See infra note 17 and accompanying text.
8. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
("[T]he four essential freedoms" of a university [include the ability] to determine for itself on
academic grounds who may teach.). See generally Warren, Academic Freedom, 114 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 689 (1914) (discussing German universities' freedom from governmental interference and its influence on American universities); Ralph F. Fuchs, Academic Freedom - Its
Basic Philosophy, Function, and History, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoBs. 431 (1963) (citing the
development of the academic freedom concept in the United States). See also Bracken v. Visitors of William and Mary College, 7 Va. (3 Call) 573, 581 (1790) (deference accorded by
Virginia Court of Appeals to college administrative body's decision not to reinstate professor).
9. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended in 1972, empowered the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission to investigate discrimination claims on the basis of
race, sex and national origin in educational institutions. Equal Employment Opportunity Act
of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 5(e), 86 Stat. 103. For an expansive prediction on how tenure
committees' peer review documents will change, see Eileen N. Wagner, Tenure Committees,
Take Heed: University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC Should Change The Way You Proceed, 64
EDuc. L. REP. 979, 993-94 (1991).
10. Ann H. Franke, Associate Secretary and Counsel for the American Association of
University Professors (which filed an amicus brief in support of the judicially recognized privilege in the Pennsylvania case) has been quoted as saying that "[t]he decision sets a tone for
governmental intervention in university affairs." Carolyn J. Mooney, Academics Are Divided
Over High Court'Rulingon Tenure Documents, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 24, 1990,
at A18. "[T]he burdens on the future defense of academic freedom are weighty." Ann H.
Franke, Life in the Academy After University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 62 EDuc. L. REP. 23
(1990). For an insightful argument urging a balance of governmental intrusions into the affairs of academic institutions, see J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A "Special Concern of
the First Amendment", 99 YALE L.J. 251, 310 (1989). See also Don Mark North, Note, University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC: The Denial of an Academic Freedom Privilege, 18 PEPP. L.
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strongly affected and the academy's historically recognized freedom
to determine who may teach will be compromised." While the immediate effect of the decision is merely to reject an academic institution's claim of privilege in federal courts during broad discovery requests for confidential personnel files, questions regarding the scope
of universities' academic freedom remain. 2
This Article will discuss the competing interests related to
granting complete access to confidential communications in Title VII
higher education employment litigation." Part II provides a historical construct of the EEOC and the Commission's most recent investigations regarding discrimination in tenure decisions. Part III examines in detail the Pennsylvania case and offers an analysis of its
probable impact." Part IV appraises this impact in the context of
future Title VII litigation and assesses the likely effect on academic
freedom. This Article concludes with a call for a balanced system of
complete access to confidential communications that could be fashioned by Congressional adjustment of Title VII's investigatory language," 5 or, in the event of legislative intransigence, by the instituREV. 213, 236 (1990).
11. University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 196 (1990) (citing Sweezy v.
New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957)). The University claimed that a "chilling effect"
on candid evaluations and decisions would ensue as a result of the disclosure, which in turn
would affect the quality of these evaluations as well as the quality of instruction and scholarship. Id. Compare Geraldine Bednash, "The Relationship between Access and Selectivity in
Tenure Review Outcomes," (1989) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Maryland)
(on file with the Dickinson Law Review) (study of colleges that allow tenure candidates access
to their files suggests that these institutions are not any less selective in awarding tenure). See
infra note 164 and accompanying text. See also Barbara A. Lee, "Peer Review Confidentiality: Is It Still Possible?," NAT'L ASS'N OF COLLEGE AND UNIV. ATTORNEYS (199 1)-(examining
the history of the confidentiality debate in the context of the present case and discussing various disclosure options for academic institutions).
12. University of Pennsylvania v. E.E.O.C., 493 U.S. 182, 201, 202 n.9 (1990). The
Court stated that it would not address the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's argument that the University's First Amendment rights may be infringed upon because of the
overriding and compelling state interest in eradicating invidious discrimination. Id. at 201-02.
See Carol D. Rasnic, Litigating the Adverse Peer Review Decision, 66 EDuC. L. REP. 1, 16
(1991) (Pennsylvania decision is a narrow decision merely upholding a federal agency's right
to obtain plaintiff's tenure review files in Title VII litigation based on a showing of mere
relevance and did not address other issues related to tenure review litigation.). See also
Daughtrey, supra note 5, at 235 ("The Supreme Court has not expressly recognized the difference between individual and institutional academic freedom in developing the outer limits of
this concept. Perusal of case law, however, strongly suggests that a finding or a denial of
academic freedom largely depends upon whether the person seeking its protection is a human
being or an institution.") (footnote omitted).
13. Title VII is not the only vehicle used to litigate tenure discrimination. 42 U.S.C. §
1981 prohibits discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts, and tenure is considered a new contract. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
14. See infra note 161 and accompanying text.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 et. seq. (1988). For a persuasive description of a modified standard of discovery, see Jaayna J. Partain, Recent Development: A Qualified Academic Freedom
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tions themselves.16

II.

Historical Construct

A.

The EEOC As Investigator

In 1972, Congress amended the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to include educational institutions within the scope of the statute's antidiscriminatory provisions.17 The amendments empowered the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)' 8 to investigate and
to end discrimination based on race, color, religion, age, sex, or national origin in hiring, promotion, firing, wage setting, testing, training, and all other forms of employment. 19 Historically, discrimination suits could only be filed against public employers under the
original Civil Rights Act of 1871.20 With the extension of the 1964
Act, higher education institutions became vulnerable to discrimina21
tion suits.
Many Title VII suits have centered around the "disparate treatment" theory, as set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,2 2
which requires a showing that a plaintiff (1) is a member of a minority or disadvantaged class; (2) sought a position for which (s)he was
qualified; (3) was rejected for the position; and (4) that the employer
kept the position open to applicants of similar qualifications and/or
promoted other persons with similar qualifications at around the
same time. 23 At all times the complainant bears the burden of proof
Privilege in Employment Litigation: Protecting Higher Education or Shielding Discriminaton?, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1397, 1423 (1987) [hereinafter Recent Development). See also
infra note 185 and accompanying text.
16. Wagner, supra note 9, at 991-97.
17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 et. seq. (1988). For a discussion of the amendment, see H.R.
Rep. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 19-20, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2155 (House
Committee on Education and Labor's Report stated that discrimination in the field of education is a critical issue and educational institutions should be subject to the provisions of the
Act.).
18. The EEOC was originally created by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
became operational on July 2, 1965. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1988).
19. Id.
20. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985 (1988). Suits filed under these sections required
a finding of discriminatory intent. See General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n, Inc. v. Pennsylvania,
458 U.S. 375 (1982).
21. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, supra note 9. See H.R. Rep. No. 238,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. 19-20, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2155.
22. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
23. Id. at 802. The Supreme Court approved these standards for use in Title VII academic employment cases in Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S.
24, 25 (1978). Compare Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) ("disparate impact"
cases where the burden shifts to the defendant after the plaintiff establishes a prima facie
case). But see Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (altering Griggs
with respect to admissible statistics used to prove discrimination).

TITLE VII LITIGATION

with respect to discriminatory intent.2 4
When a complainant files a sworn charge of discrimination with

the EEOC, the Commission is charged with the responsibility of
fully investigating the claim. Commission investigators have access
to any evidence "of any person being investigated . . . that relates to
unlawful employment practices . . . and is relevant to the charge

under investigation." 2 6 In cases involving educational institutions, a
Commission agent will typically work with a checklist developed by
the EEOC to facilitate the gathering of materials related to an investigation. 7 If an employer under investigation refuses to submit information as requested by the investigating officer, the Commission is

empowered to issue an administrative subpoena" in order to obtain
the desired information. An employer under investigation may petition the district Commission office to revoke or modify the subpoena
within five days after receipt of it." If a district director denies a

petition, the employer may appeal to the Commission Headquarters
in Washington, D.C. for a similar revocation or modification. 0
If an employer remains recalcitrant after exhausting its admin-

istrative appeals, the Commission has the authority to apply for a
subpoena duces tecum 3' in federal district court, ordering the employer to show cause why the subpoena should not be enforced. 2

Employers have often challenged such subpoena requests by claiming that a district court must find a discrimination charge well-

founded or verifiable before enforcing an EEOC subpoena.8 " The Supreme Court addressed that charge in EEOC v. Shell Oil 3 4 when it
24. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981) (holding
that burden of establishing a prima facie case is "not onerous").
25. 29 C.F.R. § 1601 (1990). The Equal Employment Opportunity Act obligates the
Commission to investigate a charge of discrimination to determine whether there is "reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true." 42 U.SC. § 2000e-5(b) (1988). If no action is
taken by the Commission within a 90 day period, the complainant may be authorized to institute a private action. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28 (1990). See Keyes v. Lenoir Rhyne College, 552
F.2d 579 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 904 (1977).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(a) (1988). The concept of relevancy has been construed broadly
when a charge is in the investigatory stage. EEOC v. University of Pittsburgh, 643 F.2d 983,
986 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 880 (1981).
27. Interview with Neil J. Hamburg, Assistant General Counsel, University of Pennsylvania (April 4, 1990).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-9 (incorporating 29 U.S.C. § 161(1)) (1988).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. FED. R. Civ. P, 45.
32. 29 U.S.C. § 161(2) (1988). The general requirements defining the scope of an administrative subpoena are articulated in United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632
(1950).
33. EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 72 n.26 (1984).
34. Id.
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acknowledged the potential burden such access to employer material
might create. In Shell Oil, the Court noted that a court's responsibility is to "satisfy itself that the charge is valid, that the material
requested is 'relevant' to the charge, and . . . to assess any contentions by the employer that [the court's] demand for information is

too indefinite or has been made for an illegitimate purpose."3 5
B.

The Academy's Response to EEOC Investigations

Academic employers, who generally pride themselves on their
unique and special character,36 frequently balk at providing confidential information to Commission investigators.37 Discovery of peer
review evaluations can seriously damage the tenure evaluation process by chilling candid evaluations and jeopardizing the collegial atmosphere on which academics rely.3 8 However, Title VII provides
for sanctions against any Commission employee who makes public
any information obtained by the EEOC prior to the institution of
proceedings involving such information. 9 Additionally, when investigations lead to legal skirmishes between employers and the Commission, some courts may issue protective orders"0 to prohibit discovery
of material that could cause annoyance or embarrassment.4 ' Other

courts may employ a combination of protective orders under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) and other means, such as private in
35. Id.
36. "[Academic] [f]reedom and economic security, hence, tenure, are indispensable to
the success of an institution in fulfilling its obligations to its students and society." American

Association of University Professors (AAUP), 1940 STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES ON
FREEDOM AND TENURE, excerpted in Brown and Kurland, supra note 4, at 326.

ACADEMIC

37. See, e.g., EEOC v. Franklin and Marshall College, 775 F.2d 110, 115 (3d Cir.
1985) (college cited the importance of confidential peer review records as the most reliable
determination of who may teach - the intrusion into such records would cause embarrassment and confrontational situations), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1163 (1986). See infra note 80
and accompanying text.
38. Michael R. Smith, Protecting the Confidentiality of Faculty Peer Review Records:
Department of Labor v. The University of California, 8 J.C. & U.L. 20 (1981-82). See also
Arthur Kroll, Title IX Sex DiscriminationRegulations:Private Colleges and Academic Freedom, 13 URB. L. ANN. 107 (1977).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(e) (1988). This protection, however, is less than complete, for
the statutory prohibition against disclosure does not apply to the charging party. See EEOC v.
Associated Dry Goods Corp., 449 U.S. 590, 598 (1981). Section 552(b)(6) of the Freedom of
Information Act exempts from disclosure personnel records that would clearly lead to an unwarranted invasion of privacy. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1988). See also Hobart Corp. v. EEOC,
603 F. Supp. 1431 (D.C. Ohio 1984) (in camera examination of sworn affidavit charging discrimination clearly illustrated specific potential chilling effect on either present or former employees from disclosure of statement).
40. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c). See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 177 (1979) (judges
should not hesitate to exercise appropriate control over the discovery process).
41. Herbert, 441 U.S. at 177.

TITLE VII LITIGATION

camera review or the use of redacted files. 2
Academic employers have challenged the interpretive standard
of relevance by which a federal agency demands a broad examination of confidential files in employment discrimination suits. Section
709 of the amended Civil Rights Act 48 states that the Commission
"shall . . .have access" to relevant evidence in its course of investi-

gating a charge of discrimination. 4 However, academics and legal
scholars have questioned whether, on the strength of mere conclusory allegations of discrimination, the EEOC should be permitted

to intrude in the tenure review process.' For example, at least one
circuit court judge has inveighed against the "automatic and unbridled searches" that constitute EEOC subpoenas."' The guardian of
academic rights, the American Association of University Professors

(AAUP), suggests that courts should balance the need for confidentiality in the faculty tenure review process against the need for disclosure.4 7 As the following recent case law makes clear, the divergence of approaches employed by the federal courts made a
compelling case for Supreme Court review.
C. Recent Title VII Academic Employment Litigation
1.

The Fourth Circuit: Keyes v. Lenoir Rhyne College.-In

42. See, e.g., EEOC v. University of Notre Dame du Lac, 715 F.2d 331, 338-40 (7th
Cir. 1983); Keyes v. Lenoir Rhyne College, 552 F.2d 579, 581 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 904 (1977); Guerra v. Board of Trustees of California State Univ., 567 F.2d 352,
355 (9th Cir. 1977). See infra notes 55 and 69 and accompanying text. For a contentious view
of the use of discovery, see Vice-President Dan Quayle's address to the American Bar Association, August 13, 1991, reprinted in LEGAL TIMES, August 19, 1991, at 8.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(a) (1988).
44. Id. See EEOC v. University of Pittsburgh, 643 F.2d 983, 986 (3d Cir. 1981) (concept of relevancy is construed broadly when a charge is in the investigatory stage), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 880 (1981). Compare with EEOC v. University of New Mexico, 504 F.2d 1296
(10th Cir. 1974) (While sole limitation imposed upon EEOC discovery procedures is whether
information sought is relevant, it is fundamental that administrative subpoenas issued under
statute require as much precision as is fair and feasible in identifying records, so as not to
constitute a "fishing expedition.").
45. EEOC v. Franklin and Marshall College, 775 F.2d 110, 119 (3d Cir. 1985) (Aldisert, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1163 (1986). See generally GREGORY LANOUE &
BARBARA A. LEE, ACADEMICS IN COURT; THE CONSEQUENCE OF FACULTY DISCRIMINATION
LITIGATION (1987); J.W. Friedman, Congress, the Courts, and Sex-Based Employment Discrimination in Higher Education: A Tale of Two Titles, 34 VAND. L. REV. 37 (1981). See
also infra note 69 and accompanying text; EEOC v. University of Notre Dame du Lac, 715
F.2d 331, 339 (7th Cir. 1983) (relevancy of requested material must be established by a "particularized need" standard demonstrated to the satisfaction of the court on a case-by-case
basis).
46. Franklin & Marshall, 775 F.2d at 117 (Aldisert, C.J., dissenting).
47. American Association of University Professors, Committee on Academic Freedom
and Tenure, A PreliminaryStatement on Judicially Compelled Disclosure in the Nonrenewal
of Faculty Appointments, 67 ACADEME 27 (1981), cited in Gray v. Board of Higher Educ.,
692 F.2d 901, 907 (2d Cir. 1982) [hereinafter Preliminary Statement].
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Keyes v. Lenoir Rhyne College,'8 a female professor sued her employer for discrimination on the basis of sex and age. 4'9 The plaintiff
returned to the college to teach after working in the federal government and requested that she be permitted to teach beyond the college's recently reduced retirement age."' After her request was denied by the administration and the Board of Trustees, the plaintiff
filed charges with the Department of Labor and the EEOC.5 1 When
the EEOC took no action within ninety days, the plaintiff received a
letter from the agency authorizing a private action. 52
The plaintiff presented evidence in federal district court that average male faculty salaries were higher than those of the female
faculty, but the district court disregarded the decision of an advisory
jury and held that the complainant professor had failed to establish a
prima facie case of discrimination because the statistical evidence
offered did not adequately demonstrate a pattern of discriminatory
behavior.53 During discovery, the plaintiff requested the production
of certain documents, including confidential faculty evaluations, but
the district court refused to order the defendant to produce the
documents.5
The plaintiff appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals,
which invoked Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
and reaffirmed the lower court's finding of no discrimination and its
refusal to compel production of the confidential materials. 5 While
the appeals court acknowledged the plaintiff's need to use the files to
demonstrate that the college's explanation for gender variances in
salaries and promotions were merely "pretextual," it remarked that
the college did not resort to the confidential evaluations for that purpose, stated that the plaintiff had no further compelling evidence to
show cause, and concluded that the lower court's decision to protect
those files from examination did not constitute an abuse of
discretion."
48.
49.

552 F.2d 579 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 904 (1977).
Id.

50. Id. at 580.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Keyes v. Lenoir Rhyne College, 552 F.2d 579 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
904 (1977). The district court also held that the college had presented "clear and convincing
evidence" to explain any disparity in salaries between the male and female faculty members
and that any differentials were based on legitimate, reasonable and nondiscriminatory factors.
Id. at 580.
54. Id. at 581.

55. Id.
56. Id. Senior Circuit Court Judge Field admitted in a concluding footnote that "such
evaluations are necessarily judgmental" and acknowledged that the court might have been

TITLE VII LITIGATION

In a dissenting opinion, Judge Craven countered that the statistical evidence presented did establish a "pattern, practice or custom
of discrimination based on female faculty members with respect to
compensation." 57 Judge Craven cited several instances in the record

where female tenured professors received lower salaries than male
non-tenured professors and noted that the college made no adequate

showing "to account for the disparity of pay in the examples"
cited. 8 The dissent concluded that the plaintiff had established a
prima facie case by the statistical evidence.5 9
2. The Fifth Circuit: Jepson v. Florida Bd. of Regents.-An
associate professor sued the Florida Board of Regents under Title
VII in Jepsen v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 0 claiming that Florida

State University had discriminated against her on the basis of sex. 61
The plaintiff alleged that the University had discriminated against
her on the basis of sex in decisions regarding promotion and salary
increases for over twenty-five years, including the period before Title
VII was amended to include colleges and universities. 62 The plaintiff
requested that the court order the University to produce the personnel files of department colleagues.6" The University replied by re-

questing a protective order, alleging that the files were confidential
and Florida law permitted the Board of Regents to "prescribe the
content and custody of limited access records" and to release such
information only upon authorization from the employee of record or

"upon order from a court of competent jurisdiction." 6

The district court ordered that plaintiff's counsel could view the
evaluation forms personally, but could not copy the documents or
faced with the "delicate question" of whether the court should substitute its own judgment for
that "of those possessing expertise" in the area of academic evaluation. Id. at 581 n.6 (citing
Green v. Board of Regents of Texas Tech Univ., 335 F. Supp. 249, 250 (N.D. Tex. 1971) (in
which the court applied an abuse of discretion standard to a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 discrimination
suit), affd, 474 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1973)).
57. Id. at 582.
58. Keyes v. Lenoir Rhyne College, 552 F.2d 579, 582 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 904 (1977).
59. Id.
60. 610 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir. 1980).
61. Id. at 1380.
62. Id. at 1381. The plaintiff claimed that the University discriminated against her prior
to 1972, the year Congress amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and applied it to
higher education institutions. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, as amended by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103. The district court took notice that
any liability would be limited to the post-Act period but admitted evidence of pre-Act discrimination from 1964-72 to show defendant's failure to correct past acts of discrimination. Jepsen,
610 F.2d at 1381.
63. Jepsen, 610 F.2d at 1381.
64. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 239.28 (West 1977)).
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discuss their contents with anyone other than the document's custodians, defense counsel, and the court.65 The district court subsequently dismissed the action, noting that subjectivity in evaluating
professors was inevitable, and absent an abuse of discretion, it was
not the function of the federal court to substitute its judgment for
that of a state administrative agency. 66 The court concluded that no
pre- or post-Act discrimination occurred and that the plaintiff's evaluations were based on performance and merit rather than on sex. 67
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the district court placed a much greater evidentiary burden on the appellant professor than was approved by the U.S. Supreme Court in Title VII cases.68 In its decision, the court opined that the district
court's limited evaluation of the pre-Act evidence led to the exclusion of highly relevant proof.69 As a result, the appellant was prohibited from introducing the confidential evaluation forms into evidence
to counter the University's claims that promotion decisions were
0
based on unbiased faculty evaluations.7
3. The Seventh Circuit: EEOC v. University of Notre Dame
du Lac.-In EEOC v. University of Notre Dame du Lac,71 a discrimination action originated when a faculty member filed a charge
with the EEOC claiming denial of tenure on the basis of race.72 The
Commission issued an administrative subpoena requiring the University to produce the personnel files of the charging party and similar
records of the complainant's colleagues. 3 The University offered to
allow an investigating officer to review the desired material, but refused to let the agency reproduce the files without signing a nondisclosure agreement or take the materials off-campus.74 The University argued that reproduction of the files would compromise the
65.
66.
67.
68.
Sweeney,

Jepsen v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 610 F.2d 1379, 1381 (5th Cir. 1980).
Id.
Id. at 1381-82.
Id. at 1382-83. The court recited the standard as articulated in Board of Trustees v.
439 U.S. 24 (1978), which vacated a First Circuit Court of Appeal's decision re-

garding the burden of proof in Title VII cases filed against universities.
69. Jepsen, 610 F.2d at 1384.
70. Jepsen v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 610 F.2d 1379, 1384-85 (5th Cir. 1980). See Winson v. Lafayette College, No. 91-5233 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 15, 1991) (Plaintiff alleged that defendant college paid her substantially less per year than a male whose job was substantially

similar.).
71. 715 F.2d 331 (7th Cir. 1983).
72. Id. at 332.
73. Id. at 333.
74.

Id.

TITLE VII LITIGATION

confidentiality of the parties involved.7 5 After being served with a
subpoena duces tecum, the University filed applications with the district and administrative offices of the EEOC.7 1 While the full Commission slightly modified the subpoena, the University did not comply with agency's request, and the Commission filed an application
in district court for an order to show cause why the subpoena should
not be enforced."
The district court heard several arguments from the University,
including a request that all documents surrendered to the EEOC be
redacted on the basis of a qualified academic privilege and that the
EEOC execute a non-disclosure agreement as a preceding condition
of the University's release of any faculty personnel files.78 The court
refused to allow the University to delete names and identifying features of the files in question and refused to allow it to condition its
release of information on the execution of a non-disclosure
agreement. 9
While conceding the utility and importance of disclosing some
of the contents of the peer review files, the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed and remanded, finding a qualified privilege established by academic First Amendment interests in maintaining candid, critical and objective peer evaluations.8 0 On remand, the court
of appeals directed the district court to permit the University to redact the desired files and to review the files in camera to determine
the necessity of redaction before releasing the materials to the Commission.81 The EEOC could obtain further disclosure only by making
a "substantial showing of particularized need for relevant information."82 Only a "compelling necessity" for specific information would
satisfy the standard.8 3 The appeals court concluded that if any further disclosure was necessary, the district court could issue any protective order it deemed necessary.8 4
75.

Id.

76. EEOC v. University of Notre Dame du Lac, 715 F.2d 331, 333 (7th Cir. 1983).
77.

Id.

78. Id. at 334.
79. EEOC v. University of Notre Dame du Lac, 551 F. Supp. 737 (N.D. Ind. 1982).
80. Notre Dame, 715 F.2d at 336-37.
81. EEOC v. University of Notre Dame du Lac, 715 F.2d 331, 338 (7th Cir. 1983).
Redaction is the deletion of names and other identifying data.
82.

Id.

83. Id. The "compelling necessity" standard for specific information requested was articulated in Douglas Oil Co. v. U.S., 441 U.S. 211, 222-23 (1979).
84. Id. at 339-40 (citing Jepsen v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 610 F.2d 1379, 1384 (5th
Cir. 1980) (court has duty to limit the use and availability of confidential documents when it
orders them produced)). See Jackson v. Harvard Univ., 111 F.R.D. 472, 474 (D. Mass. 1986)
(plaintiff must make a showing of particularized need sufficient to overcome defendant's privi-
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4. The Third Circuit: EEOC v. Franklin and Marshall College.-In EEOC v. Franklin and Marshall College,85 a French professor who was denied tenure sued the College for violating Title VII
and discriminating on the basis of national origin.8 6 The EEOC issued an administrative subpoena in the course of its investigation,
requesting materials from the personnel files of all individuals considered for tenure in the past five years.8 7 The Commission in this
case agreed to accept the desired material in redacted form.88 The
College refused to provide important information from these files
and filed a petition to modify the subpoena. 8' After the request for a
modification order was refused, the College stated that it would not
fully comply with the subpoena."0
The EEOC initiated litigation with an order to show cause and
a request for a subpoena duces tecum. 91 The district court issued an
order compelling compliance, but stayed the enforcement order
pending an appeal. 92 On appeal, the Third Circuit acknowledged the
importance of confidentiality in obtaining candid peer review evaluations in intimate settings such as Franklin & Marshall, but rejected
the Seventh Circuit's fashioning of a qualified academic privilege. 93
Further, citing precedent within its own circuit, 94 the court concluded that Congress intended to subject educational institutions to
95
the same statutory requirements applied to other industries.
The appeals court emphasized the broad investigatory powers of
the EEOC and acknowledged the Commission's power to seek out
any materials deemed relevant to a charge order investigation.9 The
court ordered the College to produce the redacted materials, 9 7 statlege). See also Mary DeLano, Discovery in University Employment Suits: Should Peer Review Materials be Privileged?, 14 J.C. & U.L. 121, 132 (1987) (criticizing the privilege).
85. 775 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1163 (1986).
86. Id. at 112.

87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 112-13.
90. EEOC v. Franklin and Marshall College, 775 F.2d 110, 113 (3d Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1163 (1986).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
94. Kunda v. Muhlenberg College, 621 F.2d 532, 547 (3d Cir. 1980) (legislative history
of Title VII and its amendments suggests tenure decisions fall within the intended scope of the
Act).
95. EEOC v. Franklin and Marshall College, 775 F.2d 110, 115 (3d Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1163 (1986). See supra note 9.
96. Id. at 116 (citing EEOC v. University of Pittsburgh, 643 F.2d 983, 986 (3d Cir.)
(the concept of relevancy is to be construed broadly when a charge is in the investigatory
stage), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 880 (1981).
97. Id.
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ing that such material may demonstrate that persons with lesser
qualifications were granted tenure or that some pattern of discrimination appears."8 The court concluded that the scope of the EEOC's
role was to determine whether there was evidence to support a
charge of discrimination and to intervene when an employment decision had been based on statutorily impermissible grounds.99
In a sharply worded dissent, Chief Judge Aldisert questioned
the value of allowing an agency "gone wild" to cast an "immense
discovery net that compromises privacy expectations" without assigning a "meager" burden on the Commission to assert a "factual,
justificatory predicate."100 Judge Aldisert argued for a balanced approach that controlled what he considered to be the excesses of the
administrative subpoena: no formal complaint filing and no "stated
boundaries to the allegation" of discriminatory behavior. 101 While he
conceded that the EEOC need not establish a prima facie case of
discrimination as a prerequisite for compelled disclosure of documents, he distinguished between the quality of a factual assertion
underlying a claim and the inherent reality of a factual predicate
underlying a claim.10 2 The subpoena, he concluded, should not be
used as a tool in search of a predicate at the expense of rights without court approval.103
III. University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC
A.

Case History

In University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 04 Wharton School of
Business Associate Professor Rosalie Tung filed a discrimination
98. Id. (comparative evidence may be appropriate to rebut employer's proffered, nondiscriminatory explanation) (citing Marion Namenwirth v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Wisconsin System, 769 F.2d 1235, 1240 (7th Cir. 1985)).
99. Id. at 117.
100. EEOC v. Franklin and Marshall College, 775 F.2d 110, 117-18 (3d Cir. 1985)
(Aldisert, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1163 (1986).
101. Id. at 121.
102. Judge Aldisert, in his dissent, stated:

Extended logically, the majority's absolutist approach elevates the ethereal factor of relevancy as the only restraint on the EEOC subpoena process. At the
administrative subpoena level there is absolutely no limitation to what is or is
not relevant. There is no complaint filed in the district court, no factual averments of "a short and plain statement of the claim," as required by Rule 8,
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, no stated boundaries to the allegation of discrimination. To accept the majority's formulation is to indulge in a classic catch22.

Id.
103.
104.

Id.
493 U.S. 182 (1990), affig, 850 F.2d 969 (3d Cir. 1988).
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complaint against the University of Pennsylvania ("Penn") in 1985
after being denied tenure. 1 5 In the charge filed with the EEOC, she
maintained that she had been sexually harassed, that her qualifications were equal to or better than those of her male colleagues in the
department, and that the explanation given for denial of tenure was
a vague pretext for racial and ethnic discrimination. 16 The EEOC
initiated an investigation of the charge and issued Penn a subpoena,
seeking Tung's tenure review file and the files of the faculty members identified in the charge as having received more favorable
treatment.' 7
Penn refused to produce a number of related documents and
applied to the EEOC for a modification of its subpoena. Specifically,
Penn requested the exclusion of documents it termed "confidential
peer review information," citing the important societal and constitutional interests in preserving the integrity of the peer review process.108 The EEOC denied Penn's application and gave it a deadline
for submission of the requested files.'0 9 Several days before the subpoena was to expire, Penn brought suit against the EEOC in federal
district court for the District of Columbia seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief and an order quashing the subpoena." 0 After the
subpoena had expired, the EEOC applied to the district court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania and sought enforcement of the
subpoena."'
The federal district court concluded that Penn had filed the first
action in the district court for the District of Columbia in order to
avoid Third Circuit precedent. 1 2 Therefore, the court denied Penn's
motion to dismiss and ordered Penn to produce the documents."'
105. See id. Section 703(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(a) (1988), makes it unlawful to discriminate "because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin." See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
106. Pennsylvania, 493 U.S. at 185.
107. Id. at 186.

108. Id.
109. University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 186-87 (1990).
110. Id. at 187 n.1. The University claimed that the EEOC had violated the First and
Fifth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5
U.S.C. § 553 (1988), by adopting a policy that constituted a national requirement of complete
disclosure of peer review materials. Such policy-making, the University argued, did not comply
with the rule requiring advance publication and opportunity for public participation requirements as set forth in the APA. See EEOC v. University of Pennsylvania, 850 F.2d 969, 973

n.l (3d Cir. 1988).
111.

Pennsylvania, 493 U.S. at 181. The Pennsylvania District Court declined to follow

the "first-filed" rule, which counsels the stay or dismissal of an action that is duplicated in
another suit previously filed in another federal court. See id. at 187 n.1.
112. EEOC v. University of Pennsylvania, 850 F.2d 969, 974 (3d Cir. 1988).
113. Id. at 978.
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Penn appealed this decision to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.1"
The Third Circuit, faced with competing claims in two district
courts, declined to dismiss the EEOC's suit in the federal district
court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania by citing "exceptional
circumstances," i.e., that Penn was attempting to "forum shop"115
and avoid precedent unfavorable to its case."' However, the Third
Circuit held that Penn had offered compelling reasons as to the need
for redacted documents and remanded that issue to the lower court
for consideration on the full record." 7
In reaching its decision, the court reviewed the language of Title VII and concluded that upholding Penn's first-filed suit would
undermine legislative intent favoring prompt and, if possible, conciliatory resolution of discriminatory claims.118 The court also concluded that since Penn did not raise objections as to the merits of the
subpoena, 1 but had instead argued that the Commission's refusal to
modify its subpoena created a national policy requiring full disclosure of academic peer review materials, any invalidation of an EEOC
subpoena "rule" would not overrule the EEOC's statutory powers in
individual cases. 120 Thus, the appeals court decision refused to place
any burden on the EEOC to justify its need for documents related to
an investigation of employment discrimination.' 2 '
In September 1988, Penn appealed to the Supreme Court
which, faced with what it regarded as a conflict in approach by the
Third 22 and Seventh 2 ' Circuits, granted certiorari limited to the
compelled-disclosure question.1 ' In an opinion written by Justice
Blackmun, a unanimous Court 25 approved the approach taken by
the Third Circuit and concluded that a university does not enjoy a
special privilege as to documents disclosed to the EEOC in the
114. Id. at 969.
115. Id. at 972, 977-79.
116. Id.
117. EEOC v. University of Pennsylvania, 850 F.2d 969, 972, 982 n.10 (3d Cir. 1988).
118. Id. at 978-79. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) et. seq. (1988).
119. See EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 72-82 (1984) (agency seeking subpoena
enforcement must ensure subpoena is definite and is seeking information relevant to the charge
under investigation).
120. University of Pennsylvania, 850 F.2d at 981. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-9 (1988) (setting forth investigatory powers of the EEOC).
121. University of Pennsylvania, 850 F.2d at 981-82.
122. EEOC v. Franklin & Marshall College, 775 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
476 U.S. 1163 (1986).
123. EEOC v. University of Notre Dame du Lac, 715 F.2d 331 (7th Cir. 1983).
124. University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 490 U.S. 1015 (1988).
125. Coincidentally, Justice Blackmun had argued for a hearing on the merits of the
Franklin & Marshallcase several years earlier. Franklin & Marshall, 775 F.2d 110 (3d Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1163 (1986) (White and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
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course of an EEOC investigation. In so holding, the Court rejected
both arguments advanced by Penn in support of its position.' 2
1. No Qualified Common-Law Privilege Prevents the Disclosure of Peer Review Materials.-Penn first claimed that a qualified
common law privilege prevented the compelled disclosure of peer review materials, citing Federal Rule of Evidence 501 as support for
this privilege.1 2 7 While the Court acknowledged the desire of Congress to provide courts with flexibility to develop rules,12 8 it declined
to fashion a new privilege for universities and expressed its reluctance to recognize a privilege in an area that Congress had already
considered . 29 The Court reasoned that Congress had weighed the

need to preserve the hallowed tradition of academic freedom against
the costs of discrimination in educational institutions and did not
consider it necessary to create a privilege for peer review documents
in §§ 2000e-8(a) and -9 of Title VII of the amended Civil Rights
Act of 1964.180

The Court reasoned that Penn did not offer persuasive justification for extension of Congress' confidentiality safeguards.' The
Court held that an extension of the existing safeguards could give
universities a litigation weapon to frustrate investigations. 3 2 Finally,
the Court rejected the claim that its own precedents supported the
fashioning of a privilege.' 33 The Court distinguished qualified privileges bearing constitutional underpinnings from those that do not en126. University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182 (1990).
127. The rule provides in part: "Except as otherwise required . . . or provided .
the
privilege of a witness shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they might be
interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience." FED. R.
EvID. 501.
128. See, e.g., Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980) (holding that the
purpose of Rule 501 is "to leave the door open to change").
129. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(a) provides that the Commission "shall at all reasonable times
have access to, for the purposes of examination, and the right to copy any evidence of any
person being investigated or proceeded against that relates to unlawful employment practices
covered by this subchapter." Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(a) (1988)). Compare with Laws v. Georgetown Hospital, 656 F. Supp.
824 (D.D.C. 1987) (recognizing a qualified privilege in a medical malpractice action relating
to materials considered in a hospital peer-review committee); Granger v. National Railroad
Passenger Corp., 116 F.R.D. 507 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (privilege extended to a corporation's internal accident reports).
130. Pennsylvania, 493 U.S. at 191.
131. University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 192-93 (1990).
132. Id. at 194. See also EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 81 (1984) (Court is
reluctant to "place a potent weapon in the hands of employers who have no interest in complying voluntarily with [Title VII], who wish instead to delay as long as possible investigations by
the EEOC.").
133.

Pennsylvania, 493 U.S. at 194.
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joy similar historical, constitutional, or statutory roots.""
2. No Privilege Grounded in "Academic Freedom" Prevents
the Disclosure of Peer Review Materials.-The Court rejected
Penn's argument that a privilege grounded in "academic freedom"
prevented disclosure.1 " 5 Penn's reliance on cases that acknowledge
the "special role" colleges and universities play in the dissemination

of ideas in our society and Penn's reliance on the Court's historical
aversion to meddling in the internal affairs of an academic institution were "misplaced." 1 6 The Court held that the cases cited by
Penn involved attempts to control content-based speech, which constituted a direct infringement on the asserted right to determine on

academic grounds who may teach.' 7 The Court rejected Penn's
claim that requiring the disclosure of peer review evaluations on a
finding of mere relevance would undermine the existing process of
awarding tenure and would cause a decline in the "quality of instruction and scholarship."' 38 The Court contrasted attempts to control content-based speech with the EEOC's right to access peer review materials and concluded that EEOC access does not prevent a

university from determining for itself on academic grounds who may
teach, except that a university may not use those criteria proscribed

by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. 3 9
The Court found the burden of such disclosure far removed
134. Id. (a privilege that exists in grand jury proceedings dates back to early laws which
were codified into federal common law) (citing Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441
U.S. 211, 218 (1979); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706 (1974) (a qualified privilege
for Presidential communications exists in the scheme of the separation of powers between
branches of the Federal Government)).
135. Id. at 196.
136. University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 197 (1990). See Keyishian v.
Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (safeguarding academic freedom's transcendent value); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957)
(One of the essential freedoms a university possesses under the First Amendment is the right
to "determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach."). Individual Supreme Court
Justices had endorsed the concept of academic freedom prior to Sweezy. See Wieman v. Updegraft, 344 U.S. 183, 196 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("[teachers] must be exemplars
of open-mindedness and free inquiry"); Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 510 (1952)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (instruction loses its validity and becomes complacent in the absence
of academic freedom).
137. Pennsylvania, 493 U.S. at 197-98.
138. Id. at 198-99. See also Barbara A. Lee, Balancing Confidentiality and Disclosure
in Faculty Peer Review: Impact of Title VII Litigation, 9 J.C. & U.L. 279, 309 (1982-83)
(arguing that the federal rules already allow judges to apply a balancing test similar to the
academic freedom privilege raised).
139. Pennsylvania, 493 U.S. at 201-02. See also supra notes 18-19 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of the Court's view of Title VII's preservation of employer's remaining
freedom of choice in hiring decisions, see Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
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from the asserted First Amendment right. 140 The court reasoned that
if Penn's claim was accepted, other content-neutral applicable laws
(e.g., tax laws or other government regulations) might be said to infringe on the First Amendment to the extent they affect university
hiring."' The Court concluded that Penn's claimed injury to academic freedom was "speculative" since confidentiality is not the
norm in all peer review systems,142 and some disclosure would ensue
even if a "special necessity" evidentiary burden were imposed on the
13
EEOC. 4
B.

Analysis

In balancing the interests of a private academic institution
against a public agency charged with investigating claims of legallyprohibited discrimination, the United States Supreme Court in Pennsylvania 144 clearly acceded to the expedience of evidence-gathering
at the expense of academic tradition. Justice Blackmun summarized
the Court's sentiments when he recognized that the peer review documents were necessary in order for the EEOC to determine whether
illegal discrimination had taken place. "Indeed, if there is a 'smoking
gun' to be found that demonstrates discrimination in tenure decisions, it is likely to be found tucked away in peer review files. 145
Nevertheless, the Court also acknowledged a university's right to autonomy and valid First Amendment concerns. 46 It sidestepped a direct assault on the "academic freedom" issue by remarking that "petitioner's claim does not fit neatly within any right of academic
freedom that could be derived from the cases on which [it] relies."' " 7
140. Pennsylvania, 493 U.S. at 199.
141. University of Pennsylvania, 493 U.S. 182, 200 (1990). Justice Blackmun further
states that a university could not claim a First Amendment violation simply because a tax law
"might deprive [the institution] of the revenue it needs to bid for professors." Id.
142. Id. See Dr. Geraldine Bednash, "The Relationship Between Access and Selectivity
In Tenure Review Outcomes" 132 (1989) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Maryland). Dr. Bednash studied the promotion and tenure process at over 100 liberal arts colleges

and discovered that there is no significant relationship between the degree of access provided
tenure candidates to their files and the rate at which faculty are tenured. For another perspective on the tenure process, see CHARLES ALLEN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM. JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 5431 (Supp. 1989) (arguing that there are other presently
unprivileged relationships that demand judicial support than the petty machinations "that too
often [pass] for peer review in academic institutions").
143. Pennsylvania, 493 U.S. at 200.
144. 493 U.S. 182.
145. Id. at 193.
146. University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 199 (1990).
147. Id. The Court went on to observe that the University demanded an expanded right
of academic freedom to protect confidential communications in peer review cases, which it was
unwilling to do. Id. See Mark Yudof, The Three Faces of Academic Freedom, 32 LOYOLA L.
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This uneasy balancing of competing concerns troubles many in
academe who view a confidential peer review system as the linchpin

of academic freedom. 1 8 The academy differs from government agencies, corporations, or churches; error may be tolerated more liberally
as long as reason is left free to combat it. 14 9 Confidences and collegi-

ality can be shattered in the intrusive search for discriminatory animus. Not surprisingly, rights asserted by faculty against other
faculty, or against academic institutions, have led to conflicts in
which both parties claim the protection of academic freedom. 5 '
Others argue that a veil of secrecy under the guise of academic
freedom serves to perpetuate the existing establishment. 151 They

claim confidentiality is a "canard," a polite fiction that assumes the
effectiveness of collegial, shared governance.' While it is true that
tenure applicants generally have a right to file an appeal if a tenure
decision is unfavorable, the ultimate review is often conducted pro
forma.155 Critics cite at least one case of discrimination where the

First Circuit reversed a decision because of a plaintiff's failure to
administrative decision was affected by racial
prove that the final
4
15
considerations.
REV. 831 (1987).
148. See, e.g., J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A "Special Concern of the First
Amendment," 99 YALE L.J. 251, 253 (1989) (questioning whether American law operates on
an impoverished understanding of the unique and complex functions performed by our
universities).
149. Remarks of Thomas Jefferson, in a dedicatory address in honor of the founding of
the University of Virginia (April 1819).
150. See, e.g., Keyes v. Lenoir Rhyne College, 552 F.2d 579, 580 (4th Cir. 1977) (holding that salary differences between male and female faculty members were based on legitimate
and non-discriminatory factors), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 904 (1977); Peters v. Middlebury College, 409 F. Supp. 857, 860 (D.C. Vt. 1976) (defendant college prevailed on basis of criticizing
plaintiff's intellectual qualities and teaching style, despite plaintiff's allegations that she was
too "political" after having introduced a feminist perspective). See also John J. Byrnes, Comment, Academic Freedom v. Title VII Will Equal Employment Opportunity Be Denied on
Campus?, 42 OHIo ST. L.J. 989, 1003 (1981) (nonmeritorious considerations can often infiltrate the tenure review process because of individual prejudice, bias, and unwanted university
and departmental politics, which foster subjectivity in the review system).
151. See Mary Gray, Academic Freedom and Nondiscrimination:Enemies or Allies?,
66 TEX. L. REV. 1590, 1592 (1988). See also Richard J. Yurko, JudicialRecognition of Academic Collective Interests: A New Approach to Title VII Legislation, 60 B.U. L. REv. 473,
491 (1980) ("Academic institutions are accorded judicial deference unless a plaintiff can prove
discrimination, but few plaintiffs can prove discrimination because academic institutions are
accorded judicial deference.").
152. Robert Neilsen, A Terminal Case of Collegiality, ON CAMPUS, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS,

February 1990.

153. Generally, an applicant's tenure review receives input from a departmental committee, a department chair, a dean of the academic department, a college or university-wide
faculty committee, and a provost, or university executive. See Brown and Kurland, supra note
4, at 335 for alternatives to tenure in the academy.
154. Kumar v. Board of Trustees, 774 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1097 (1986).
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An analysis of the Pennsylvania1" case yields little in the way
of ground-breaking legal doctrine. While the decision did codify a
procedural discovery requirement in cases investigating higher education employment discrimination, it limited this requirement to a
specific statutory provision.1 56 Nor did the decision offer much in the
way of substantive insight into the content of the compelled disclo-

sures.1 57 The Court began and ended its decision with disclaimers
that it was not ruling on the question of whether the EEOC's subpoena permits a university to engage in any redaction of the disputed

records before producing them.15 Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that a university's academic freedom interest in maintaining
the confidentiality of its peer review process must yield to an alleged

victim's right to obtain evidence necessary to substantiate charges of
1 59
discrimination in the tenure process.
IV. Impact on Future Title VII Litigation: Wither Academic
Freedom?
The most obvious impact of the Pennsylvania60 case is the in155. University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182 (1990).
156. Id. at 191. But see Gray v. Board of Higher Educ., 692 F.2d 901, 905 (2d Cir.
1982) (discrimination action filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 requires plaintiff to show more than
discriminatory impact).
157. Pennsylvania, 493 U.S. at 187 n.2, 202 n.9. The Court's decision twice mentioned
in footnotes that redaction, or the deletion of names and other identifying data of the files
requested in the subpoena, was not an issue.
158. Id. The University of Pennsylvania has already delivered documents to the EEOC
that have been "minimally redacted." Interview with Neil J. Hamburg, Assistant General
Counsel for the University of Pennsylvania (April 4, 1990). It is expected that negotiations
will ensue between the Commission and the University regarding the sufficiency of the evidence submitted. Future litigation regarding the sufficiency of the redacted documents may be
"likely." Id. The President of the University of Pennsylvania, Sheldon Hackney, has responded
to several public denunciations of the decision to offer redacted documents. ALMANAC, University of Pennsylvania, April 24, 1990, at 3-5.
Minimal redaction which removes only names and their equivalent is a compromise position which the recent Supreme Court decision has left open . . . . We
have no intention of using redaction to impede the EEOC's inquiry into the merits of the complaint. Indeed, we have invited the EEOC to discuss with us the
specific documents at issue so we can satisfy the agency's concerns about what
has been deleted.
Id. The Pennsylvania Chapter of the American Association of University Professors (AAUP)
has urged the University to reconsider. "[It] is not in the best interests of the faculty involved.
Submission of complete information would not be a violation of general assurances of confidentiality to writers of those letters nor [sic] a threat to the tenure review and promotion process."
Remarks of Elsa L. Ramsden, President, President Chapter of the AAUP, delivered at the
University Faculty Senate Meeting (April 18, 1990). "[The door is open for a defendant
university faced with a subpoena to bargain with the EEOC for redaction." See Alexa Ross
and Joan L. Curcio, Supreme Court Strikes the Balance in Favor of Peer Review Materials,
63 EDUC. L. REP. 689, 699 (1991).
159. Rasnic, supra note 12, at 16.
160. University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182 (1990).
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ability of academic institutions to refuse an EEOC subpoena when
charged with Title VII discrimination litigation. No longer may universities hide behind an evidentiary shield of privilege when confronting administrative discovery requests.""1 However, granting ac-

cess to federal investigators does not render an institution completely
vulnerable. Federal statutes provide that Commission investigators
may not disclose any of the contents of discovery to the public.' 62
While the complainant, or charging party, has not been con-

strued to be a "member of the public,"' s courts have been mindful
of the possible chilling effects of permitting wholesale release of
EEOC investigatory records to charging parties.'" At least one federal court has held that a plaintiff in an employment discrimination
action has no access to the records of fellow complainants who have
filed EEOC charges against an employer. 6 5 Thus, an aggrieved
faculty member who seeks background information with which to
launch an independent discrimination or defamation suit,' upon the
exhaustion of administrative remedies, could be enjoined from gaining even temporary access to certain records obtained by the
161. "Indeed if there is a "smoking gun" to be found that demonstrates discrimination
in tenure decisions, it is likely to be tucked away in peer review files." Id. at 193. It has been
noted that the Pennsylvania decision is a narrow ruling involving a discovery request between
the EEOC and a defendant university charged with discrimination. Rasnic, supra note 12, at
16. However, internal appeals or grievance hearings would not necessarily be covered but most
likely would be limited to rules promulgated by the institution or a collective bargaining unit.
See Wagner, supra note 9, at 994 and Lee, supra note 11, at 5.
162. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(a) (1988) prohibits any officer of the Commission from making public in any manner any information obtained by the Commission pursuant to its authority. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.22 (1987).
163. See H. Kessler & Co. v. EEOC, 472 F.2d 1147, 1152 (5th Cir. 1973) (Provisions
against nondisclosure of results of investigation to public does not "prohibit Commission from
divulging to parties involved or their counsel information obtained by Commission during its
investigation."), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973); Greene v. Thalheimer's Dep't Store, 93
F.R.D. 657, 660-61 (E.D. Va. 1982) (party charging discriminatory employment practices was
not a member of the public to whom disclosure of materials was forbidden).
164. See, e.g., EEOC v. University of Notre Dame du Lac, 715 F.2d 331, 338 (7th Cir.
1983).
165. Guruwaya v. Montgomery Ward, Inc., 119 F.R.D. 36 (N.D. Cal. 1988). Indeed, it
is often cited that the federal judiciary often employs a "laissez-faire" attitude when deliberating on discriminatory animus in higher education tenure review cases. See Rasnic, supra note
12, at 13-14; GREGORY LANoUE & BARBARA A. LEE, ACADEMICS IN COURT: THE CONSEQUENCES OF FACULTY DISCRIMINATION
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236 (1987) (researchers report that

faculty discrimination plaintiffs have prevailed in only about 20% of the reported judicial

decisions). See also Franke, supra note 10, at 24 for a discussion of the various legal standards
used to judge demands for access to confidential peer review materials among federal circuit
courts of appeal; Ross and Curcio, supra note 158, at 692.
166. A common worry among faculty members offering peer review comments is the
threat of a libel suit. Libel is, of course, governed by state law. For a complete listing of
common-law defenses available to a potential defendant in a libel action, see Wagner, supra
note 9, at 991-92 n.62.
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EEOC. 16 The Federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 6 8 also
provides exemptions from disclosure of personnel and medical

records if the disclosure could cause an undue violation of privacy.' 69
In the event a trial court issues an administrative subpoena requiring a university to submit full and open. records in accordance
with an EEOC investigation, a university's prospects for dismissal of
the charges can be assured, absent any blatant discriminatory ani-

mus, which is often difficult to prove.17 0 Legal wrangling and delays
increase the costs of litigation and can diminish the prospects of even
7
the most aggrieved litigant.1 '

A study published by the American Association of University
Professors (AAUP) reveals that in Title VII cases decided on the

merits, only 20% of faculty plaintiffs won. 172 While the spirit of Title VII generally calls for making the victim of discrimination whole,

i.e., providing a plaintiff with a tenured promotion, this remedy is
not always offered. 73 No more than a pyrrhic victory is achieved
when a successful litigant returns to the same hostile workplace and
faces similar treatment.
One possible effect is that universities will adopt clearer peer
review standards as a safeguard against employment discrimination
litigation.' 7 4 Justice Blackmun observed in Pennsylvania that "[some
167. The Pennsylvania decision does not require colleges to give files directly to the
plaintiff without a subpoena from the EEOC. University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S.
182, 191 (1990).
168. 5 U.S.C. § 552 et. seq. (1988). Documents released under this Act to an applicant
are routinely redacted for national security and other considerations. Id.
169. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1988). State freedom of information acts may also be used
as shields to information gathering in tenure discrimination suits. See Jepsen, supra notes 60
and 64 and accompanying text.
170. For a useful compendium of cases detailing victorious academic defendants, see
GREGORY LANOUE & BARBARA A. LEE, supra note 165, at 34; Mary Gray, Academic Freedom and Nondiscrimination: Enemies or Allies?, 66 TEx. L. REV. 1590, 1600-10 (1988);
Phoebe A. Haddon, Academic Freedom and Governance, 66 TEx. L. REv. 1561, 1563 (1988).
But see EEOC v. Franklin and Marshall College, 775 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1985) (EEOC did not
pursue the case after being provided access to the confidential files.), cert. denied, 476 U.S.
1163 (1986).
171. Mandatory access to peer review materials may also cause more courts to demand
that a plaintiff show subjective tenure qualifications when presenting prima facie evidence of
discrimination. See Franke, supra note 10, at 24-25.
172. See Preliminary Statement, supra note 47, at 27.
173. See, e.g., Ford v. Nicks, 866 F.2d 865 (6th Cir. 1989) (successful plaintiff in Title
VII discrimination action was entitled to reinstatement as assistant professor, but was not
entitled to reinstatement with tenure since court could not say with certainty whether tenure
would automatically be granted in plaintiff's case). One possible remedy plaintiffs may seek is
redress through state court if the state allows jury trials in discrimination suits. One such
plaintiff won a $1 million judgment in California. Jack McCurdy, Cal. Jury Awards $1 Million to Teacher Who Charged Racism in Tenure Denial, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUC., April
25, 1990, at All.
174. The University of California has proposed a new personnel policy that would pro-
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evaluators] may simply ground their evaluations in specific examples
and illustrations in order to deflect potential claims of bias or unfairness." 7 5 One commentator has gone so far as to say that an evaluator should write as if the review were to be plastered on the front of

a newspaper. 176 Another commentator adds that Pennsylvania
"should encourage . . . institutions to keep records more carefully. '177 Contrary to many institutions' fears, clearer peer review
standards would serve to improve the quality of tenure and promotion decisions.
A recent study1 78 by a doctoral candidate at the University of
Maryland surveyed 103 institutions' policies regarding access to tenure review policies and concluded that there was no relationship between the degree of access provided and the rate at which faculty
are tenured.179 However, this survey did not address the effects of
completely open review systems. 80 One university has successfully
accommodated a limited open review system. Facing a lawsuit from
a law professor who alleged gender discrimination, the university allowed outside experts to review the files of six males granted tenure
before the complainant."8 ' The outside panel concluded that the law

professor had met university standards for tenure. 82 The university
accepted the panel's conclusions and reinstated the complainant with
83
tenure.1
Even if Pennsylvania's'8 4 impact is to strengthen the investigavide its faculty with greater access to their files and records. Jack McCurdy, U. of Cal. May
Widen Faculty Access to Files, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUC., March 20, 1991, at A19. The
policy would allow faculty members to view evaluations made by peers, but the files would be
redacted. Id.
175. University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 200-01 (1990).
176. Remarks of Harry Tepker, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUC., January 24, 1990, at
AI8.
177. Remarks of Michael Olivas, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUC., January 17, 1990, at
A17.
178. Bednash, supra note 142.
179. Benash, supra note 142, at 322. Interestingly, this study did not assess the effects
of tenure review processes that require complete openness. See, e.g., University of Alaska v.
Geistauts, 666 P.2d 424 (Ala. 1983) (mandating that promotion and tenure review meetings
be held in open forum). Dr. Bednash concedes that disclosure might have limits beyond which
the tenure review process could be harmed. Bednash, supra note 142, at 325.
180. Bednash, supra note 142, at 325. This study was cited by the Supreme Court in its
unanimous opinion in University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 206 (1990). The
guaranteed confidentiality of the survey participants was ironically noted during the Fall, 1989
oral arguments before the Supreme Court. See Darlene Ricker, Tenure Under Review, STUDENT LAWYER, April 1991, at 23.
181. Boalt Hall Professor Eleanor Swift filed suit in 1987 and received tenure after the
panel's review in 1989. See Ricker, supra note 180, at 20-21.
182. Ricker, supra note 180, at 20-21.
183. Ricker, supra note 180, at 20-21.
184. University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182 (1990).
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tory powers of the EEOC in connection with discrimination com-

plaints at academic institutions, discovery demands can still be challenged. The Court in Pennsylvania did not address the issue of
content as applied to the demanded discovery. 185 A defendant university can still submit subpoenaed peer review documents to the EEOC
in an altered format to preserve the anonymity of the participants, to
protect the confidential and collegial environment, and to preserve a
remainder of academic freedom in the process. If challenged by the
Commission, it can cite the lack of compelling precedent addressing
redaction of peer review documents. In effect, universities still enjoy
a qualified privilege as regards peer review documents for an important reason: they still enjoy a presumptive academic freedom to decide what to redact and what not to redact.1 86 Thus, a significant
protection for full and frank evaluations has tacitly been accorded
187
academic institutions.

For the moment, colleges and universities arguably still retain a
great amount of academic freedom when threatened by tenure discrimination litigation. The courts' persistent deference to university
decision-makers regarding internal personnel and curriculum matters 18 s implicitly suggests that aggrieved academic plaintiffs still
carry a heavy burden of proof in Title VII discrimination cases.1 89 In
addition, those in academia are still left free to modify, circumvent,
or change their peer review systems in a manner intrinsic to the sensibilities of their peers. For example, a college or university is free to
conduct peer reviews anonymously to safeguard the privacy of all of
the involved parties.1 90
Moreover, it is not entirely clear that the Pennsylvania case
completely rejects the use of a peer review privilege in federal courtmandated subpoenas. The present ruling only applies to cases in
which faculty members file employment discrimination claims with
185. Id.
186. See Daughtrey, supra note 5, at 247.
187. Pennsylvania, 493 U.S. at 187 n.2, 202 n.9.
188. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. See also Elizabeth Bartholet, Application
of Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 HARV. L. REV. 947, 977 (1982) (distinguishing the
bench's deference to universities' employment matters with judgments made in other settings).
189. See Franke, supra note 10, at 25-26; Robert M. Hendrickson, Legal Issues Surrounding the Tenure Decision in Higher Education, 58 EDuC. L. REP. 433, 441 (1990) (suggesting that a plaintiff has a difficult time in surviving proof strategies used by the courts).
190. The delicate issue of handling verbal discriminatory remarks is, of course, more
difficult. See Mary Delano, Discovery in University Employment Suits: Should Peer Review
Materials Be Privileged?, 14 J. COL. & U.L. 121, 138 n.9 (1987) (explaining that courts often

find discrimination by inference from circumstantial evidence, such as remarks offered by colleagues at committee meetings).
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the EEOC under the provisions of Title VII.' 9' It is also not clear
that an employer must surrender all peer review material for Commission inspection.1 92
Congress could resolve the inherent confusion and create a statutory privilege protecting academic peer reviews, 93 but that would
clearly be inimical to Title VII causes of action in higher education
discrimination claims and would be contrary to earlier Congressional
intent. 9 Thus, the effect of the Supreme Court's denial in Pennsylvania of a judicially recognized academic privilege as regards peer

review documents may be characterized as an exercise in constitutional colloquy: the Court may have taken a presumptive academic
freedom away, but it tacitly allowed the debate to continue when it
declined to address the issue of redacted documentation in discovery
requests.' 9 5

In order to mitigate the threat of enhanced governmental regulation into the affairs of the academy and to further the effective
gathering of relevant information used to investigate charges of discrimination under Title VII, 96 Congress could amend the statute
and clarify the standard of discovery of academic peer review materials sought by the EEOC in higher education tenure litigation. Such
a standard might require the Commission to employ a balancing test
that: (1) establishes a clear and sufficient need for the desired information, (2) establishes that the information is not available from any
other source, and (3) recognizes the unique nature of the academy's
hiring procedures-thereby limiting the review of unredacted, confidential information. 9 7 Such limitations could, as the basis for a privilege, include time, location, and personnel considerations. 9 8 A court
would still be able to control the access to discovery, 9 but not the
191.

University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 201 (1990).

192. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
193. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
194. See Charles J. Stevens, Comment, Preventing Unnecessary Intrusions on University
Autonomy: A Proposed Academic Freedom Privilege, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 1538, 1543 (1981)
("fixing a university privilege in a federal statute would undermine the judicial flexibility
sought by Congress in adopting rule [sic] 501.").
195. Pennsylvania, 493 U.S. at 187 n.2, 202 n.9.
196. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
197. Recent Development, supra note 15, at 1431. See also supra note 194, at 1556
n.37.
198. "The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communication
must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation." 8 J.
HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS IN COMMON LAW

omitted).
199. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.

§ 2285 n.4 (1961) (emphasis
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content of the documents. °0 A clarified set of discovery standards
can aid a federal investigatory agency in its search for discrimination
with minimal intrusion into the affairs of the academy.
V. Conclusion
The Supreme Court has narrowly addressed the issue of a judicially created academic freedom privilege in relation to the EEOC's
power to obtain, through the use of subpoenas, relevant peer review
201
materials in a university tenure Title VII discrimination suit.
However, the Court has not commented on the academy's presumptive academic freedom to challenge subtly the federal agency's discovery demand. 20 2 This challenge may take the form of a university
altering information to frustrate the discovery process and unduly
burden a plaintiff's ability to prove a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII. 20 3 Congressional amendment of Title VII's investigatory language, 20" employing a balancing test of relevance,
provenance and confidentiality in the context of judicially-administered discovery, would aid in the search for relevant information in
tenure discrimination claims while not compromising the unique nature of confidential peer review in the academy. Given a set of clarified discovery standards, the subjective peer review system could retain its intrinsic free quality and the federal investigatory system
would gain a measured, more responsive tool in its quest to rid employment organizations of invidious discrimination. Academic freedom can coexist with regulated conduct.20 5

200. Recent Development, supra note 15, at 1397, 1431.
201. University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182 (1990).
202. Id. at 187 n.2, 202 n.9.
203. Id. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
204. Pennsylvania, 493 U.S. at 187 n.2, 202 n.9.
205. Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54, 59 (1967) (protections of Title VII need not create a hostile atmosphere with its surveillance measures).

